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Diverse bodies: the challenge of new theoretical approaches to medical 
anthropology 
 Simon Cohn (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) & Rebecca Lynch 
(London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) 
 
In recent years, medical anthropology has benefited a great deal from debates in 
science studies, and in particular, the focus on knowledge practices (Pickering, 
1995) and epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1999). At the same time, within 
anthropology, work exploring post-human orientations– for example, the focus on 
materiality and the role of objects, human-animal relations, and environmental 
approaches – have invigorated debate not only about how central people should be 
in our ethnographic accounts, but also from what, or who’s, perspective (Viveiros 
de Castro, 2009). Core to all these areas of study has been an increasingly 
commonplace reference to the word ‘ontology’. Although important differences exist 
in the use of the term, as a starting point let us say the word concerns not only the 
status of what is known, but also the status of that which knowledge is based on. 
This so-called ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology over the last decade is 
consequently both a theoretical and methodological set of arguments that seek to 
provide new insights to old problems (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017).  
But surprisingly these debates have only tentatively been drawn on directly in 
medical anthropology to explore the relationships between culture, biology, health 
and medicine. We say surprisingly because the subfield has always had to confront 
such things as the viability of universal illness categories, how to evaluate the 
efficacy of local treatments, or the problem of representing the experience of others, 
especially when they are suffering or in distress.  So, by engaging with some of the 
work from STS and mainstream social anthropology, this special issue presents a 
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range of contrasting papers that explore the extent to which such work not only 
might offer genuinely new analytic approaches to think through established 
concerns we, as medical anthropologists, have to confront, but also potentially 
generate new areas for enquiry. Given the imperative of medical anthropology – to 
engage with illness and suffering with a view to helping alleviate them – this issue 
of Anthropology and Medicine extends the arguments to also ask what pragmatic 
and ethical contributions they might make. Finally, a key matter that the overall 
collection raises is the extent to which the stale opposition between applied and 
more theoretical anthropology might be discarded once and for all through 
arguments that emphasise the cultural basis of even the most fundamental 
concepts we draw on, including any distinction between knowledge and practice. 
 
One world, many views 
To introduce these discussions, let us begin from an obvious starting point. The 
word ontology is traditionally used in philosophy to refer to the nature of being and 
existence – to questions of entities and reality itself.  This, therefore, distinguishes 
it clearly from epistemology, which concerns ways to know or study that reality 
(Hastrup, 2004). What should appear obvious from this is that ontology is 
presented as a resolutely singular word – reality is simply what is, and therefore 
cannot exist in different forms, even if our knowledge or investigations into it (note 
the singular pronoun) might lead to a wide variety of interpretations and 
understandings. Now, we see this straightforward and unproblematic starting point 
in much of the social sciences through a set of convictions that have been inherited 
from centuries of Western intellectual thought, and are now so embedded in our 
everyday thinking that we simply don’t notice them. These include; that the 
external world is fixed and singular, that knowledge is cumulative and ever-
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refining, and that although new techniques and perspectives might raise 
epistemological questions (that is, concerning how and what can be studied or 
known about the world), these concerns ultimately have no bearing on the nature 
or existence of that world, which exists independent to its enquiry. The work of 
individual disciplines is thereby presented usually as fundamentally one of 
epistemology – establishing distinct means to know that world by drawing on 
different methods, techniques, analytical tools and theories. 
One can consequently see many of these elements throughout our own discipline. 
In fact, as we shall argue, that they have served as the basis for a great many 
contributions anthropology has been able to make to wider debates. Beyond 
technical matters about how best to know the world, anthropology has always 
reflected upon what assumptions drive such enquiry, and so has seen its role as 
one that investigates the cultural perspectives of that world, and the ways in which 
it is socially constructed: Do people experience time differently? What does 
someone see if they don’t have a word for a particular colour? What might it be like 
to have a radically different emotional lexicon? And so on. Of course, individual 
scholars, and different theoretical schools over the years have sometimes taken a 
clear position on such questions – evoking different degrees of relativism or 
universalism. But core to all of them is the distinction made between reality and its 
representation. For example, one can see this in such things as the continued 
distinction made in anthropological debates between sex and gender, colour and its 
perception, and of course disease and illness. In this way, our focus has generally 
been on the degree to which local categories or experiences are universal or not, 
rather than the apparently nonsensical question of whether reality is universal or 
not.  
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The point is that we, as anthropologists, have largely concerned ourselves with 
cultural representations and how people come to make sense of, and live in, the 
same world differently. Often this approach draws heavily on the notion of ‘belief’ 
(Paleček and Risjord, 2013). For example, anthropologists may well ask how is it 
that members of a culture believe that a particular ritual, involving certain 
symbols, might heal the afflicted, or how it is that the involuntary fits of a person 
are thought to be the result of spirit possession (Fadiman, 1997). Anthropology’s 
important contribution has been to incessantly contexutalise such individual 
beliefs within the socio-political context and a culture’s general cosmology, in order 
to suggest the underlying logic by which a specific belief makes sense. But as Good 
rightly points out (Good, 1994), using the word belief in this way, although 
intended to be sympathetic and respectful, has the danger of implicitly elevating 
the position of the anthropologist as having a different kind of standpoint. Or, to 
put this another way, by reproducing the idea that ‘they’ have beliefs, there is an 
inherent danger that this endorses the position that ‘we’ (whether that implies 
anthropologists, medics, or other collectivities) have, in contrast, ‘knowledge’. 
More could certainly be said on this issue in terms of asking what ultimately is the 
difference between belief and knowledge, or indeed (taking our cue from current 
concerns in the political sphere) between fact and value (Latour, 2004). But here we 
simply want to emphasise the way in which, although highly productive, this 
approach has often been a timid way of confronting cultural difference. We regard 
the approach as a side-ways manoeuvre because it permits anthropologists not to 
have to engage square-on with the more central problem; how can one fully respect 
alternative claims about the world, take them seriously for what they are, and 
potentially find ways to reconcile radical differences, without subjugating one with 
another? Because of this avoidance we have, perhaps inadvertently, not only 
reproduced, but reinforced, the position that reality itself is fixed and singular. But 
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as a result, we either have colluded with the implicit notion that ultimately ‘we’ 
know best, or simply have left it to other disciplines to make claims about reality 
itself. 
 
Extending claims of difference 
This emphasis on cultural variation and social construction has, of course, been 
fundamental to how historically medical anthropology gained its intellectual 
purchase. It also provided a set of political resources: not only to argue for claims 
of unity and equality, but equally that cultural variation should be defended and 
celebrated. In this way, anthropology has always acknowledged a productive 
tension between relativism and universalism, and thereby challenged voices that 
articulate one at the exclusion of the other. But appreciating the extent to which 
different perspectives set up different patterns of rationality that can generate 
radical alterities has led some to argue anthropology should not only be concerned 
with questions of epistemology and representation, but broaden its scope to 
matters of ontology (Henare, Holbraad, & Wastell, 2007; Viveiros de Castro, 2009; 
2012). The fundamental challenge is to somehow find ways to acknowledge and 
accept that what is at stake might be what we take reality to be, rather than just 
how it comes to be known, perceived or understood. This, then, is a call for 
anthropology to extend its reach beyond matters of how cultures represent, to 
asking what are the worlds people live in that they represent. 
It is certainly true that weak versions of this move tend sometimes to resemble old, 
established arguments about cultural relativism, especially when authors slip in to 
using terms such as ‘worldviews’, which suggests a plurality of perspectives, but 
leaves a singular world unscathed (Carrithers, Candea, Sykes, Holbraad, & 
Venkatesan, 2010). However, stronger versions attempt to go further, and argue 
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that by taking what others say seriously one faces a central intellectual and, we 
would say, ethical choice; either to accept that one version of reality may well be 
more truthful or accurate than another, or commit to the idea that realities can be 
different (Holbraad, Pedersen, & Castro, 2014). This latter idea is, of course is far 
from an easy position to adopt. But perhaps that uncomfortableness is its central 
virtue. 
However, this development certainly raises a number of problems. For example, the 
linguistic basis of a great deal of anthropological engagement from fieldwork to 
writing, can easily fall foul of matters of translation and over interpretation. And 
beyond this, of course, there will always been concerns that established debates 
that problematised culture and holism (Strathern, 2002) are in danger of being 
overlooked, and that by attributing distinct realities to discrete cultures simply 
provides a new means to reify them. These methodological concerns, however, are 
far from new or specific to debates about ontology. In fact, given anthropology’s 
long-term concern with such matters, one might argue that it is well placed to find 
innovative ways to make them part of enquiry, rather than obstacles to it. 
Ingold (2014) has recently pointed out that participant observation is only an 
oxymoron if one starts from the premise that subject (participant) and object (that 
observed) are unconditionally distinct categories. But the history of anthropology 
has enduringly demonstrated how the distinction between subject and object, or 
observer and observed, only ever emerge dialectically; in other words, one is always 
defined by the other. Given this, the methodological value of participant 
observation should not be curtailed by crude criticism of bias or researcher 
interaction, because such accusations rest on the assumption that objectivity can 
exist absolutely and independently (see Daston and Galiston, 1992). Rather, 
participant observation is a means to capture the emergence of an object in relation 
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to the anthropologist as subject. Although the extent to which this relational aspect 
is explicit in ethnography only become evident in more modern writings (especially 
since the seminal text Writing Culture, Clifford and Marcus, 1986), arguably it has 
always been a matter that frames how anthropology should be valued, and hence 
the kind of claims it makes about the social world. 
Readers can hopefully see in this discussion about method that there are also 
imbedded considerations about ontology. For, if the objective world can only be 
realised through the subjective engagement of the anthropologist ‘being there’ 
(Geertz, 1988), any a priori, independent existence of the world is called into 
question. Here again, the same choice we introduced earlier is revisited in a slightly 
different guise. One can either follow the more usual line of thinking and say all 
that is at stake is that this particular world cannot have existed prior to its 
observation. Or one might at least explore the more unorthodox approach that no 
particular world can exist prior to its observation – because no world can be 
accorded with the status of existence other than through some kind of interaction 
with it. We are acutely aware of the sense of uncomfortableness that such a 
position invokes; after all, most of us spend our lives investing in the idea that the 
world we inhabit is independent to us. Just the term ‘inhabit’ suggests an 
independent environment we are situated in. But the boundary between self and 
other is increasingly being questioned and destabilised, not only in anthropological 
writings (Descola, 2013), but across a diverse arrange of disciplines and types of 
enquiry (Haraway, 2008). The ontological turn, then, might not only be a result of 
academic debate about reality and its representation, but also changing 
sensibilities around how we come to understand and define being human in 
relation to the world that we interact, and intermingle, with. 
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Practice and Multiplicity 
During a recent medical anthropology workshop, in response to one speaker 
suggesting that no disease category can ever be fully absolute or stable, one of the 
most sceptical participants suggested that actually there are some states of the 
body that we all must surely accept are definitive. ‘Take pregnancy,’ he proclaimed. 
‘Either a woman is pregnant, or she is not’. At first, this appears to be an 
incontrovertible example, as most people at the event concluded. But it is 
important to be vigilant to the extent the language we use to describe the world 
doesn’t spill over and entirely dictate how we might understand that world to be. In 
other words, just because our words in English, at least, present a simple either/or 
option with regard to pregnancy, this should not prevent us from being open to 
alternative ways of understanding pregnancy that do not follow a simple binary. 
Ideally, then, we should give sufficient freedom to the world for it to push back and 
resist how we may want or expect it to be. 
The point is, as one starts to reflect on an absolute definition of pregnancy it 
rapidly becomes more and more uncertain – does it really start from conception, or 
when a fertilized egg travels down the fallopian tube, or only once it has 
successfully embedded into the wall of the uterus? And even when it comes to 
conception; is this when a sperm is able to penetrate the ovum, or when its DNA is 
released, or when the DNA combines with that of the egg to become a zygote? 
Clearly, as one zooms in, the notion of a single, definitive event, continually evades 
our view. But even if such matters of scale and chronology were to be agreed upon 
– by some pragmatic consensus or coherent theoretical rationale - that is not the 
end of the issue. From a woman’s perspective, the definition of pregnancy may not 
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driven by some objective external criteria at the microscopic or even molecular 
level, but instead regards it as a description of her entire state of being and, indeed, 
a state of potential. Today, many over-the counter pregnancy tests are very 
different technologies to those available a few years ago. They are now much more 
reliable and sensitive, allowing results much sooner after possible conception. So, 
whereas a few years ago a woman would not know if she had conceived until a few 
weeks afterwards, she now can do so after just a few days. The upshot is that she 
may well now experience joy, trepidation or perhaps regret, earlier. And whereas in 
the past she would not even have been aware of being pregnant, she may now also 
have to deal with loss if that fertilised egg fails to thrive early on. The point is that 
from her perspective, the definition and meaning of pregnancy has altered in a very 
real and tangible way; the test she has bought not merely identifying if she is 
pregnant, but actively determining what pregnancy actually is. An illustration like 
this points to the intersection of both scale and standpoint determining not merely 
the ‘perspective’ adopted, but also the reality that emerges.  
The example not only illustrates that fact that there are no definitive states or 
categories relating to the body, but that claims about reality more generally often 
differ – whether this is between scientists and non-scientists, or different scientific 
perspectives. Studies of science from within and beyond anthropology have drawn 
on such matters, from detailed accounts of scientific practices in the lab (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979), to other places, such as the clinic and beyond (Jensen, 2010; Mol, 
2002). One theme has explored the assumption that scientific knowledge is 
universally applicable – leading, for example, to the idea that human biology is 
inescapably a local concern and inevitably contingent on a wide variety of social, 
physical and physiological circumstances (Lock, 2001). By committing to the idea 
of ‘local biologies’ talk of a stable single biological reality is challenged, not simply 
because it highlights variation but also constant change, as living things and their 
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environments are in dialogue with each other (Brotherton & Nguyen, 2013). More 
recently, such areas as social neuroscience and epigenetics have further supported 
the idea that the social and biological are in constant dialogue with each other, 
leading to continual diversification and difference (Lock, 2013; Niewöhner, 2011). 
But a further area of work investigating scientific knowledge practices has placed 
particular emphasis on the ways in which they are not merely techniques for 
representing and understanding reality, but of actually constructing or achieving a 
reality that can be scrutinised and rendered knowable (Law, 2008; Moreira, 2004). 
World-making, then, rather than world-viewing. A vacuum has to be made in order 
for it its effects to be known; a subatomic particle has to be violently separated in 
order for it to be observed; an area of tissue has to be stained and placed in a 
microscope in order for pathology to be identified. Such practices make realities in 
particular ways. We may be tempted to say, ‘but wait, that reality existed prior to 
any intervention by the scientist; all you are describing are the necessary means to 
make things visible.’ Yet arguments from science studies might claim otherwise: 
these particular things, as they come to be, and hence be known, are always and 
inevitably the result of particular activities and events. From this positon, there is 
no pre-existing reality other than an undifferentiated potential (what Latour refers 
to as the multiverse); instead, reality is only that which is made into existence at a 
moment in time, in a certain location, through a specific set of interactions. 
What is key to much of this work is that in contrast to the anthropological debates 
around ontology that centre on language and communication, emphasis is often 
placed on human practice. The strength of this is that rather than consider claims 
of different realities as being intimately associated with how they are symbolic 
represented, attention is paid to how practice creates reality (Slife, 2004). These 
debates do not merely suggest that realities are practically constructed but that 
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different ontological claims frequently come to be juxtaposed in everyday life. This 
then introduces something that anthropological debate has tended to side-step: 
talking about ontologies is inevitably talking about power and politics (Mol, 1999). 
The juxtaposition of these realities may not always be in terms of cultural 
differences across large distances, but often the close and proximal ways in which 
diverse ontologies sometimes contradict, sometimes cohere, and at times manifestly 
compete with each other. This dimension of the debates about ontology has 
particular relevance for medical anthropology.  
Earlier, we argued that the problem with the notion of social construction is that its 
remit has always been concerned with representation; how people make sense of 
their world – a world that, by implication exists prior to, and often independent, of 
them. But if one accepts that any world is continually co-produced by a wide 
variety of forces, and that human engagement consists of ‘making’ as much as 
‘making sense’, suddenly arguments about construction need not be constrained 
simply to matters of representation; the world is constructed both materially and 
semiotically, in combination. Our desk is constructed. The computers we are typing 
with are constructed. Your feelings are constructed. And so too, are illnesses. To 
say something is constructed does not mean it is not ‘real’, as a colleague once 
claimed all ‘postmodernists’ assert; quite the opposite. Things are real because they 
are constructed. Through a wide range of convergent forces, ranging from the 
molecular properties of materials (Barad, 1998) to the semantic networks that give 
an object its distinct status (Duranti, 2011), there is nothing that can be said to 
exist prior to its construction. (Clearly, humans don’t have to be involved at all in 
processes of construction – although the realities constructed are ones that, as a 
consequence, we cannot know about.) 
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Take tuberculosis, for example; as we conceive it today through our tests and 
treatments, it is a combination of many different things knotted together. But this 
current version of the condition is not the same as when Hippocrates described 
something he called phthisis (Daniel, 2006), nor, arguably, is it exactly the same all 
over the world (Koch, 2013). Whilst there may be good grounds to assert sufficient 
similarity to warrant a standardised biomedical conception of the disease, there 
may alternatively be valid claims: that the microbacterium varies; that the resulting 
pathology takes different forms; that dissimilar treatments shape the condition very 
differently; or that the illness experience is so varied, that a singular term fails to 
acknowledge the inherent variation.  To say TB is constructed is merely to point out 
the fact that its status as a particular disease object is the result of many different 
things and processes, including the material and biological, forged into something 
we may take to be, at present, a singular entity.  
Much of this argument should feel familiar to medical anthropologists. There have 
always been accounts of how different cultural experiences can manifest in very 
material, physiological ways that not only escape a common universal medical or 
biological paradigm, but also resist the usual causal claims of ‘biology first, culture 
second’. But for many, this current iteration of the debate feels limited by their 
apparent lack of engagement with subjective experiences such as emotions, and 
the extent to which the attribution of meaning, often in a diffuse form, shapes the 
nature of entities. This is because, whilst medical anthropology has perhaps been 
as guilty as other areas of social anthropology by amplifying difference and even 
romanticising otherness, this is set in particular tension with the call to empathise 
with, care for, and sometimes act on behalf of, others. Our particular orientation 
consequently invites a complementary kind of politics to those derived from 
proposing multiple or competing ontological difference: one that might tentatively 
suggest a common ethics based on empathy and proximity. As a result, the 
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particular focus on medical anthropology– on matters or health, medicine and the 
body – is not merely an arbitrary site to test out the work, and perhaps the 
limitations, that a concern with ontology or ontologies might enable. Rather 
medical anthropology has the potential to offer some very particular sites of 
resistance and engagement that have more general consequences.  
 
The Collection  
As these debates become incorporated into the current discipline, including how it 
is taught to the next generation of scholars, one might argue that the central value 
of such discussions is to accept that there may not be a definitive answer. 
Definitive answers have always been an anathema to anthropology, after all. But 
they can still have real value, opening up space in the intellectual imagination, and 
hence the worlds that we are able to engage with, and demanding a reflexive 
critique of even our most fundamental categories and assumptions. 
The contributions in the Special Issue consequently introduce a specific bundle of 
contemporary theoretical approaches and terms through papers that are 
nevertheless grounded in rich, first-hand ethnography. Rather than representing 
the wholesale import of these ideas, they test out their usefulness and novelty of 
these as applied to core medical anthropology concerns.  More specifically, all the 
authors have chosen to explore the ontological status of the body, as it is 
constructed by different fields of biomedicine and beyond. The papers make use of 
different ethnographic contexts (Brazil, Qatar, the UK, Guatemala, Denmark, the 
Netherlands) to engage with literature from STS and social anthropology concerning 
ontology and epistemology, exploring the extent to which they offer new ways to 
think about the complex relationships between the body, health and medicine, and 
more general anthropological concerns relating to relativism and representation. 
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They consider different medical concerns (obesity, genetic cancer risk, weight, 
miscarriage, appetite, death) and question whether a number of specifically 
Western repertoires have not only shaped medical anthropology but have been 
centrally productive, exploring to what extent the sub-discipline is inevitably 
fashioned by its underlying ontological assumptions, and what things might be 
concealed in the process. Focusing primarily on how human bodies are made and 
done, the papers adopt a general scepticism as to whether bodies can be conceived 
of as existing prior to, and independent of, ways of making them known. They 
ultimately respond to the challenge of attending not merely to what people say and 
do, but the material and semiotic worlds that saying, and doing, ‘do’, and the 
multiplicities that might then be produced.  
In the first paper of the collection, Emily Yates-Doerr takes up Scheper-Hughes and 
Lock’s well-established work on the ‘three bodies’ (Scheper‐Hughes and Lock, 1987) 
to consider how more recent theorising in science studies might reconfigure this 
classic paper.  Through her work on weight in Guatemala, Yates-Doerr (2017)  
concludes that some bodies are more relevant than others, and that rather than 
seeking to create better definitions of health and the body we should instead aim 
towards more fruitful engagements between medical and non-medical practices. 
The value of this practice-orientation and its potential to reconfigure is also taken 
up by Else Vogel in her paper. Vogel (2017) considers the different types of ‘hunger’ 
that were constructed during a weight loss course in the Netherlands. Mindfulness 
coaches recast what Vogel terms ‘normative registers’ by encouraging participants 
to recognise the many hungers they can have, and what else ‘feeds’ their lives. 
Vogel suggests that these techniques for drawing out and discerning these hungers 
do not introduce different ‘norms’ but instead reconfigure normativity itself.  
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Rather than taking a lead from Mol’s ‘praxiology’ as Yates-Doerr and Vogel do, 
Sahra Gibbon draws on the work of Margaret Lock to consider the different sorts of 
‘local biologies’ that are articulated in Brazilian cancer genetics (Gibbon, 2017). 
Diverse ontologies of ‘the body’ and ‘the biological’ are materialised in the clinics 
she attends and in the accounts she draws out. These intersect and cohere in 
different ways so that there are more than one but less than many ‘local biologies’ 
at stake. While Gibbon’s work focuses on these multiple bodies within her fieldwork 
location, in Susie Kilshaw’s paper, it is precisely the location itself that constructs 
the ontological multiplicity she examines. Through work on pregnancy and loss in 
Qatar, Kilshaw (2017) suggests that different contexts construct different foetuses; 
foetuses have multiple realities dependant on their situatedness rather than 
biological value. Through detailed descriptions of foetuses alive, at different stages 
of development, lost, and disposed of, Kilshaw weaves together these different 
multiplicities and the consequences they have for the women involved.   
In contrast, Maryon McDonald’s paper sees the limits of the turn to the ontological. 
She locates her argument through historical developments in anthropology, links 
and disjunctions between ‘the Oxford School’ of Edwin Ardener and contemporary 
authors such as Viveiros de Castro and Mol. To these developments McDonald 
(2017) adds her own work on dealing with death and cadavers within biomedicine- 
for medical students undertaking dissection, in organ donation practices, and in 
the ways a body is declared ‘dead’. While biomedicine recognises different ways in 
which death is ascertained, she nevertheless argues that medicine seeks to reify 
death as a universal notion, actively seeking a ‘mono-realist singularity’. She 
argues we should take this ambition seriously, as well as something we should 
treat ethnographically. This differs from the direction taken by Bodil Just 
Christensen, Line Hillersdal and Lotte Holm in their own engagements with 
biomedicine (Just Christensen, Hillersdal & Holm, 2017). They instead suggest that 
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ontological approaches can offer opportunities for collaboration between 
anthropology and medicine and space for interdisciplinary developments. Coming 
from different disciplines, yet all working on bariatric surgery in Denmark, Just 
Christensen et al (2017) examine how the concept of ‘appetite’ was a key concern 
but constructed differently. Through the experiences of collaboration, they 
reconceptualised appetite as a ‘fractional object’ with multiple relations and 
enactments; a turn that then allowed alternative exploration of scientific and 
anthropological practices within the field.  
Collectively, these papers give ethnographic examples of a theoretical reconfiguring 
in practice. Across them ontologies are located in particular spaces- through Yates-
Doerr’s work we see how particular equipment and measurements construct 
particular ontologies in clinical and non-clinical spaces; Gibbon seeks to locate 
biological ontologies in relation to emotional and ancestral constructions; while for 
Kilshaw, it is the very location of her object of study that constructs its ontological 
position. Multiple ontologies are drawn out in many of the papers also, and may 
compete (Vogel), are more or less easy to reconcile (McDonald), or can be 
themselves productive for medical anthropologists undertaking interdisciplinary 
work (Just Christensen et al). Rather than advocating situated specificity that 
would resist wider comparison, the ontological locatedness and multiplicity detailed 
in each instead point to particular politics at play. By focusing on how these 
ontologies are ‘done’ rather than what they ‘are’, the contributions explore how 
ontological categorisations might have wider implications for such things as 
morality and status (Kilshaw); which or whose ontologies take precedence and 
‘count’ (Vogel, Just Christensen et al, Yates-Doerr); how different realities relate to, 
or reinforce, wider inequalities (Gibbon); ways in which acknowledging different 
ontologies might lead to a more careful medical anthropology (Yates-Doerr, Just 
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Christensen et al); and to what extent the ‘ontological turn’ might be considered a 
political move within medical anthropology itself (McDonald).   
As a result, the focus of this Special Issue thereby also becomes political and 
ethical, raising new questions and finding alternative spaces of engagement for 
medical anthropology and their interlocutors. The value of the collection is 
accordingly not merely to contribute to the development of theory but to propose 
ways of engaging with wider aspects of human experiences and the worlds they are 
coupled with. By drawing closely on detailed accounts, the issue explores in what 
ways broad conceptual debates open up the specifics of an ethnographic encounter 
in radically new ways, or whether in fact what they really do is catalyse a more 
nuanced awareness of established debates and concerns. 
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